For too long, the United States and Europe have act­ed as a safe haven for the wealth acquired by fam­i­lies of cor­rupt lead­ers. While some of the coun­tries that once formed part of the Soviet Union have man­aged to tran­si­tion to demo­c­ra­t­ic forms of gov­ern­ment over­seen by the rule of law, many – pre­dom­i­nant­ly in Central Asia and the Caucasus – suf­fer from high lev­els of cor­rup­tion, human rights’ abus­es and a lack of polit­i­cal free­dom. Many can be described as klep­toc­ra­cies – where the rul­ing elite abuse their pow­er to make vast for­tunes from the country’s assets (often oil and gas, and oth­er nat­ur­al resources) at the expense of the people.

Much of this wealth ends up in for­eign bank accounts: the recent FinCEN scan­dal high­lights how glob­al banks help klep­to­crats laun­der their ill-got­ten gains into the United States and Europe. The cor­rupt are thus helped by coterie of Western ‘gate­keep­ers’: bankers, real estate agents, com­pa­ny ser­vice providers, PR agents, lob­by­ists and lawyers, who turn a blind eye on the ori­gin of the wealth in return for a share of the spoils. 

The trans­fer of illic­it cap­i­tal into the West from klep­toc­ra­cies not only deprives cit­i­zens who live in these coun­tries of much-need­ed rev­enue, it also has a cor­ro­sive effect on the juris­dic­tions where the mon­ey ends up: law­mak­ers’ opin­ions are swayed by shad­owy lob­by­ists, paid-for arti­cles in Western media paint rosy pic­tures of cor­rupt autoc­ra­cies, house prices are dis­tort­ed by the influx of dubi­ous for­eign cap­i­tal. The glob­al com­mu­ni­ty needs to do more to stem the tide of dubi­ous and illic­it cash flow­ing from klep­toc­ra­cies into the so-called devel­oped world.

The con­tin­u­ing protests in Belarus high­light the close link between a lack of polit­i­cal plu­ral­i­ty and klep­toc­ra­cy. Though Belarus does not pos­sess plen­ti­ful oil and gas reserves this has not stopped the rul­ing elite from tak­ing vast sums of mon­ey out of the coun­try. Non-prof­it organ­i­sa­tion The Journalism Fund esti­mate that since com­ing to pow­er President Lukashenko and his entourage have mis­ap­pro­pri­at­ed an esti­mat­ed $10 bil­lion from the Belarussian peo­ple. Much of this mon­ey has made its way into Western Europe and off­shore zones. The UK Times recent­ly report­ed how a Belarusian busi­ness­man with close links to Lukashenko bought London prop­er­ty worth £18 mil­lion ($23.2 mil­lion) through a web of off­shore companies.

In Azerbaijan, major busi­ness hold­ings are con­trolled by President Ilham Aliyev’s wife’s fam­i­ly and his two daugh­ters, Leyla and Arzu. Ata Holding, a Panamanian com­pa­ny found­ed in 2003 that holds over $490 mil­lion in assets in Azerbaijan’s bank­ing, telecom­mu­ni­ca­tions, con­struc­tion, min­ing, and oil and gas sec­tors, was revealed to be owned by Leyla and Arzu fol­low­ing a data scrape of the Panamanian com­pa­ny reg­istry. Other poten­tial­ly lucra­tive deals have end­ed up in the hands of the first fam­i­ly in murky cir­cum­stances. In 2007, 30-year leas­es on five lucra­tive min­er­al fields in Azerbaijan were award­ed to an Azerbaijani com­pa­ny, AIMROC. Panamanian reg­is­tra­tion records list Leyla and Arzu Aliyeva as senior man­agers of a com­pa­ny involved in AIMROC’s own­er­ship struc­ture. The wealth that such deals cre­ates is often rein­vest­ed into inter­na­tion­al prop­er­ty. The Aliyev fam­i­ly have been report­ed to own prop­er­ty in Dubai worth around $40 mil­lion and in London worth at least £50 mil­lion ($74.8 mil­lion). President Aliyev’s recent call to pri­va­tize state oil and gas com­pa­ny SOCAR can only raise red flags. 

When such a pri­va­ti­za­tion was tout­ed in the 1990s, the propo­si­tion of get­ting a slice of Azerbaijan’s lucra­tive oil com­pa­ny led to wide­spread fraud and bribery. One fraud­ster from the Czech Republic attempt­ed to fix the deal (which ulti­mate­ly did not hap­pen) in his favour by pay­ing bribes amount­ing to mil­lions of dol­lars to Azerbaijani offi­cials, includ­ing to President Heydar Aliyev (Ilham’s father, the third pres­i­dent of inde­pen­dent Azerbaijan) and his family.

In 2017, OCCRP and oth­er news out­lets report­ed on the ‘Azerbaijani Laundromat scan­dal’, a mon­ey-laun­der­ing oper­a­tion and slush fund that han­dled $2.9 bil­lion over a two-year peri­od. The mon­ey passed through four shell com­pa­nies reg­is­tered in the UK that held accounts in an Estonian branch of Danske Bank, Denmark’s biggest bank. The exact ori­gin of the mon­ey is unknown, but over half of the mon­ey came from an account held by a com­pa­ny at the state-owned International Bank of Azerbaijan (IBA). The UK’s National Crime Agency has frozen two prop­er­ties worth a com­bined £22 mil­lion ($28.4 mil­lion) from the wife of IBA’s for­mer chair­man, Zamira Hajiyeva, who famous­ly spent over £16 mil­lion over a ten year peri­od in lux­u­ry depart­ment store Harrods.

Much of the ‘laun­dro­mat’ cash was used to try and influ­ence pol­i­cy mak­ers in the U.S. and Europe. For exam­ple, as report­ed by OCCRP, one recip­i­ent of these dubi­ous funds was a Baku-based orga­ni­za­tion called Renaissance Associates, which received over $1.65 mil­lion to bank accounts it held in Liechtenstein and Switzerland. Between July 2012 and December 2015 Renaissance Associates paid a lob­by­ing firm in Virginia $1.533 million. 

Worryingly, between 2008 and 2016, the company’s pres­i­dent was invit­ed to rec­om­mend for­eign aid bud­gets to Azerbaijan and Armenia before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Matters. The lob­by­ist paint­ed Armenia, Azerbaijan’s region­al rival, as a rogue nation while prais­ing Azerbaijan’s sup­posed progress. Furthermore, accord­ing to OCCRP, “between 2012 and 2015, indi­vid­u­als reg­is­tered as lob­by­ists act­ing direct­ly or indi­rect­ly on behalf of Renaissance made thou­sands of dol­lars in dona­tions to polit­i­cal can­di­dates, includ­ing to Senators and Representatives who were sit­ting on, or chaired, appro­pri­a­tions sub­com­mit­tees at the time.” In Europe, fur­ther inves­ti­ga­tions by OCCRP indi­cate that at least three politi­cians and a jour­nal­ist who wrote pos­i­tive sto­ries about Azerbaijan were among the recip­i­ents of these taint­ed funds.

Another recip­i­ent of ‘laun­dro­mat’ cash– receiv­ing over $250,000 through a com­pa­ny reg­is­tered in Wyoming – was a U.S. oil and gas con­sul­tant of Azerbaijani ori­gin. He attempt­ed to influ­ence American pol­i­cy regard­ing Azerbaijan, includ­ing through a non-prof­it orga­ni­za­tion, U.S. Azeris Network (USAN) based in Houston, Texas. USAN helped orga­nize a con­fer­ence in Baku, Azerbaijan, that was attend­ed by eleven mem­bers of Congress, ten of whom were paid for. This led to an inves­ti­ga­tion by the House Ethics Committee as the con­fer­ence was secret­ly fund­ed by SOCAR.

In Kazakhstan, the country’s first pres­i­dent, Nursultan Nazarbayev, stepped down in 2019 after 29 years in office, yet the klep­to­crat­ic sys­tem remains the same, with mem­bers of his fam­i­ly and close polit­i­cal allies con­trol­ling vast sec­tions of the econ­o­my. A recent inves­ti­ga­tion by Swiss NGO Public Eye demon­strat­ed how the sale of Kazakh oil is monop­o­lised by struc­tures con­trolled by Nazarbayev’s son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev, in part­ner­ship with the Vitol Group. Over the last three decades, struc­tures owned by Kulibayev have qui­et­ly pri­va­tized large sec­tions of the Kazakh oil, gas and min­ing indus­try, net­ting the busi­ness­man bil­lions of dollars. 

Along with his wife Dinara – Nazarbayev’s daugh­ter – Kulibayev also owns Kazakhstan’s largest bank, Halyk. A size­able chunk of the family’s wealth has been put into real estate: in 2007, Kulibayev bought the man­sion of Prince Andrew, a mem­ber of the British Royal Family, for £15 mil­lion, despite the fact it was val­ued at £12 mil­lion. It was lat­er report­ed that Andrew was advised by one agent that the house was worth about only £8 mil­lion on the open mar­ket and pos­si­bly as lit­tle as £6.4 mil­lion at auc­tion — £8.6 mil­lion less than what Kulibayev bought it for. In the same year, Kulibayev also bought oth­er prop­er­ties in the UK, one of which – a man­sion in the exclu­sive London dis­trict of Mayfair – has stood emp­ty for 14 years, accord­ing to prop­er­ty blog Who Owns England. 

The Swiss media report­ed that Dinara bought a huge prop­er­ty in Geneva in 2010 worth SFr74.7 mil­lion ($71 mil­lion). The Nazarbayev fam­i­ly also built a man­sion with 13 bed­rooms in Lloret de Mar, just out­side of Barcelona, despite it being in an envi­ron­men­tal­ly pro­tect­ed zone.

Nazarbayev’s eldest daugh­ter, Dariga, is a politi­cian who first became a mem­ber of the Kazakh par­lia­ment in 2004. She became a mem­ber of the Senate In 2016, and served as Senate Chair from 2019 to 2020. Forbes esti­mat­ed her wealth in 2013 to be around $595 mil­lion, indica­tive of the com­plete enmesh­ing of the busi­ness and polit­i­cal spheres in Kazakhstan. Such wealth was under scruti­ny recent­ly when £80 mil­lion ($103.3 mil­lion) of prop­er­ty owned in London by Dariga and her son Nurali was sub­ject to an Unexplained Wealth Order (UWO) in the UK, where prop­er­ty own­ers have to explain the ori­gins of the wealth used to buy the hous­es in ques­tion, else risk hav­ing them frozen. 

Although the UWO was dis­missed by a London court – which drew in large part on court rul­ings from Kazakhstan, which lacks an inde­pen­dent judi­cia­ry – ques­tions remain about the sys­tem that allowed Nurali and Dariga to acquire such vast wealth in the first place. For exam­ple, Nurali bought one London prop­er­ty after receiv­ing a $65 mil­lion loan from Nurbank, a bank that he chaired at the time and whose largest share­hold­er was Dariga. There is no evi­dence that the loan was ever paid back. Another unsolved ques­tion is the own­er­ship of a large sec­tion of London’s famous Baker Street, worth around £130 mil­lion ($167.8 mil­lion). Nurali and Dariga owned this lucra­tive prop­er­ty as of 2018, although the prop­er­ty did not form part of the UWO, and cur­rent own­er­ship is unclear.

Nursultan Nazarbayev him­self has been shown to be the per­son­al recip­i­ent of sus­pi­cious trans­ac­tions in a scan­dal that came to be known as ‘Kazakhgate’. A case was brought under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act against an American busi­ness­man who was accused of mak­ing more than $84 mil­lion of unlaw­ful pay­ments to Kazakh offi­cials and buy­ing them lux­u­ry items. Court doc­u­ment indi­cates that the main recip­i­ents of the pay­ments (which were relat­ed to Kazakhstan’s oil deals) were President Nazarbayev him­self, and the then Minister of Oil & Gas, Nurlan Balgimbayev. 

The funds were used by Balgimbayev to buy a $910,000 house in Massachusetts, over $180,000 worth of dia­mond jew­ellery and a $20,000 Swiss spa vaca­tion for his fam­i­ly. Nazarbayev used around $45,000 of the mon­ey to pay for an exclu­sive Swiss board­ing school for his youngest daugh­ter, Aliya. $201,000 had also been with­drawn from an account held in Switzerland that pros­e­cu­tors alleged was con­trolled by Nazarbayev. On top of this, the American busi­ness­man also pur­chased two fur coats worth $30,000 for Nazarbayev’s wife and daugh­ter, an $80,000 Donzi speed­boat (giv­en by Balgimbayev as a gift to Nazarbayev), two snow­mo­biles for Nazarbayev and his wife, and paid for the tuition fees of Nazarbayev’s daugh­ter at George Washington University in Washington, D.C.

Headlines regard­ing Uzbekistan have been dom­i­nat­ed in recent years by legal pro­ceed­ings against Gulnara Karimova, the daugh­ter of Uzbekistan’s first pres­i­dent, Islam Karimova. In March 2019, Gulnara was sub­ject to crim­i­nal charges brought by the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) in rela­tion to a tele­coms bribery scheme. A 2013 DoJ press release alleged that Karimova received more than $800 mil­lion from a vari­ety of inter­na­tion­al com­pa­nies in order to enable them to enter and oper­ate in the Uzbek telecom­mu­ni­ca­tions mar­ket. One such com­pa­ny, VimpelCom, a Russian-Norwegian tele­com oper­a­tor that is reg­is­tered in Netherlands and pub­licly trad­ed in the U.S., agreed to pay $795 mil­lion in penal­ties to U.S. and Dutch author­i­ties. A sec­ond, Swedish firm Telia, agreed to pay $965 mil­lion in fines and penal­ties. Much of what Karimova received was ploughed into inter­na­tion­al real estate (UK, France, Switzerland, Dubai, Hong Kong) whose val­ue is con­ser­v­a­tive­ly esti­mat­ed at around $200. The UK’s Serious Fraud Office froze three of Karimova’s prop­er­ties held in and around London. How to repa­tri­ate the funds back to Uzbekistan has proven to be a con­tro­ver­sial top­ic in Switzerland: the Swiss author­i­ties are exam­in­ing claims against a pros­e­cu­tor who is alleged to have agreed to return the $800 mil­lion to Uzbek author­i­ties in exchange for Uzbekistan’s recom­mit­ting to Switzerland’s vot­ing block at the IMF.

Kyrgyzstan has lived through two rev­o­lu­tions, one in 2005 and a sec­ond in 2010, that in large part were caused by the cor­rup­tion and crony­ism of its first two pres­i­dents, Akaev and Bakiyev. Much atten­tion has been focussed on Bakiyev’s son, Maxim, who occu­pied a key posi­tion in the state’s busi­ness sec­tor while try­ing to con­sol­i­date the country’s assets in pri­vate struc­tures con­trolled by him. Maxim was even accused of prof­it­ing from the sup­ply of jet fuel to an American air­base in Kyrgyzstan’s cap­i­tal, Bishkek. After the rev­o­lu­tion, Maxim fled to the UK, where he was grant­ed asy­lum, despite being accused by the Kyrgyzstan’s new author­i­ties of steal­ing mil­lions of state funds. In 2010, Maxim bought a £3.5 mil­lion ($4.5 mil­lion) man­sion just out­side London, using an anony­mous com­pa­ny that anti-cor­rup­tion NGO Global Witness linked to an alleged mon­ey-laun­der­ing scheme used to get the funds out of Kyrgyzstan.

A more recent OCCRP inves­ti­ga­tion has demon­strat­ed how, since 2012, hun­dreds of mil­lions of dol­lars have been trans­ferred into bank accounts in Europe, the United States, and the Middle East on behalf of a sin­gle well-con­nect­ed Kyrgyz fam­i­ly. The mon­ey has been used to pur­chase a $1.2 mil­lion home near Washington, DC, and a house in California for $722,000, and oth­er prop­er­ty in Austria and Dubai. OCCRP report that a co-investor in the Dubai prop­er­ty was the wife of a pow­er­ful for­mer deputy head of Kyrgyzstan’s state cus­toms service.

In Tajikistan, the rul­ing fam­i­ly has vir­tu­al­ly pri­va­tised the state alu­mini­um firm TALCO by rout­ing its prof­its through a com­pa­ny in the British Virgin Islands, Talco Management Ltd (TLM), which exclu­sive­ly con­ducts trade for Talco. In 2013, the Economist alleged that the prof­its that pass through TLM amount to hun­dreds of mil­lions of dol­lars a year, and that Tajikistan’s pres­i­dent Emomali Rakhmon “per­son­al­ly over­sees TALCO.”

Turkmenistan remains the most repres­sive coun­try in Central Asia, if not the world. The country’s busi­ness sec­tor if dom­i­nat­ed by the fam­i­ly of President Berdymukhamedov. His rel­a­tives (most notably his six sis­ters and their chil­dren) monop­o­lise large sec­tions of the com­pa­ny, includ­ing the import and export of goods. Meanwhile, Berdymukhamedov’s son-in-law has been report­ed to have acquired prop­er­ty in France and the UK, and the Turkmen Ambassador to the United States and his fam­i­ly has acquired prop­er­ty in the U.S. worth over $6 mil­lion dol­lars, includ­ing four hous­es, three apart­ments and a tract of for­est near the Canadian border.

Recommendations for the United States

• Support the sanc­tion­ing of cor­rupt actors from Central Asia and the Caucasus via the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act;
• Consider adding cor­rupt actors from Central Asia and the Caucasus to the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN list);
• Support the con­tin­ued enforce­ment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to hold to account those involved in bribery in klep­to­crat­ic coun­tries;
• Support the Department of Justice in inves­ti­ga­tions that aim to iden­ti­fy, freeze and repa­tri­ate funds stolen by cor­rupt offi­cials from klep­to­crat­ic coun­tries, and to hold to account those gate­keep­ers that help these indi­vid­u­als laun­der crim­i­nal pro­ceeds into the United States;
• Support the con­tin­ued use of Geographic Targeting Orders that require addi­tion­al report­ing require­ments for high-val­ue real estate trans­ac­tions in loca­tions across the United States;
• Support in Congress H.R.3441, the Kleptocrat Exposure Act, a bill that aims to make pub­licly avail­able the names of those indi­vid­u­als denied a visa due to involve­ment in gross vio­la­tions of human rights or sig­nif­i­cant acts of cor­rup­tion;
• Support in the Senate S.1889, the TITLE Act (True Incorporation Transparency for Law Enforcement), that will require reg­is­tered U.S. com­pa­nies to sub­mit to the State a list of their ben­e­fi­cial own­ers, mak­ing it hard­er for the polit­i­cal­ly exposed to use anony­mous shell com­pa­nies reg­is­tered in the United States to laun­der cor­rupt funds.

Recommendations for the European Union

• Consider adding to the list of those sub­ject to EU finan­cial sanc­tions mem­bers of the Eurasian rul­ing elites who have been shown to have been involved in dubi­ous or ille­gal finan­cial activ­i­ty;
• Review the ‘gold­en visa sys­tem’ of cer­tain mem­ber states that allows the polit­i­cal­ly exposed to ‘buy’ EU cit­i­zen­ship, con­fer­ring on them both legit­i­ma­cy and fur­ther oppor­tu­ni­ties for mon­ey laun­der­ing;
• The European Commission should crack­down on those Member States that have failed to prop­er­ly imple­ment the 5th AML Directive EU’s 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive requir­ing all Member States to set up a cen­tralised reg­is­ter of the ulti­mate ben­e­fi­cial own­ers of com­pa­nies;
• Consider set­ting up an European Anti-Money Laundering Agency, as rec­om­mend by the Hudson Institute in 2019;
• Co-ordi­nate on anti-klep­toc­ra­cy ini­tia­tives and crim­i­nal inves­ti­ga­tions with the United States and the United Kingdom.


  1. Ermurat Bapi, chief edi­tor of “DAT” news­pa­per, Kazakhstan
  2. Botagoz Isaeva, civ­il soci­ety activist, Kazakhstan
  3. Zhandos Kashkimbay, IA Voice of Kazakhstan
  4. Fatima Zhandosova, civ­il soci­ety activist, Kazakhstan
  5. Togzhan Kozhalieva, chair of move­ment “Hak”, Kazakhstan
  6. Omіrhan Altyn, EuroKazakh Forum, Kazakhstan
  7. Aytkul Kashirbekova, co-chair of move­ment ”Qazaq Ulttyқ patri­ot­tary”, Kazakhstan
  8. Nurlan Bulanbaev, co-chair of move­ment Qazaq Ulttyқ patri­ot­tary, Kazakhstan
  9. Timur Tokseitov, chair of unreg­is­tered par­ty “Shanyraq”, Kazakhstan
  10. Ardak Ashim, civ­il soci­ety activist, pris­on­er of con­science by AI, Kazakhstan
  11. Zhuaspaeva Gulnar, civ­il soci­ety activist, Kazakhstan
  12. Zhenіsbek Sybraim, co-chair of unreg­is­tered par­ty Halyq demo­c­ra­t­ic par­ty, Kazakhstan
  13. Zhanat Kazakpay, co-chair of unreg­is­tered par­ty Halyq demor­at­ic par­ty, Kazakhstan
  14. Nurul Rahimbek, civ­il soci­ety activist, Kazakhstan
  15. Kanagat Takeeva, head of the mort­gage move­ment, Kazakhstan
  16. Azamat Raev, civ­il soci­ety activist, inde­pen­dent observ­er, Kazakhstan
  17. Ermek Kulshanov chair of move­ment Qazaq bіr­lіk tuy, Kazakhstan
  18. Kurmangazy Rakmetov, head of OO  ”Zheltoqsan”, Kazakhstan
  19. Ersen Tolkeev, civ­il soci­ety activist, Kazakhstan
  20. Kydyrali Amir, head of of OO “Atazhurt zhas­tary”, Kazakhstan
  21. Akezhan Magzhanovich Kazhegeldin, ex-prime min­is­ter of Kazakhstan
  22. Serik Medetbekov, rep­re­sen­ta­tive of Kazakhstani Initiative for Asset Recovery), Kazakhstan
  23. Ermek Narymbaj, inde­pen­dent jour­nal­ist, Kazakhstan
  24. Miras Nurmukhanbetov, inde­pen­dent jour­nal­ist, Kazakhstan
  25. Baltash Tursumbayev, civ­il soci­ety activist, for­mer deputy Prime Minister, Kazakhstan
  26. Sergei Duvanov, for­mer polit­i­cal pris­on­er, inde­pen­dent jour­nal­ist and blog­ger, Kazakhstan
  27. Kanat Ibragimov, civ­il soci­ety activist, painter, Kazakhstan/US
  28. Pulatjan Ahunov, Chairman of Association Central Asia, Uzbekistan/Sweden
  29. Abdurahmon Tashanov, Human Rights orga­ni­za­tion of Uzbekistan “Ezgulik”, Uzbekistan
  30. Qubad Ibadoglu, Chairman of Movement for Democracy and Prosperity in Azerbaijan, Economics pro­fes­sor Rutgers University, Azerbaijan/US
  1. Khadija Ismayil, inde­pen­dent jour­nal­ist, Azerbaijan
  1. Chemen Ore, Turkmenia Unite/SES Movement, Turkmenistan / US
  1. Hanum Rasulova, Turkmenia Unite/SES Movement, Turkmenistan / Turkey
  1. Dowlet Bayhan, World Turkmens’ Democracy Platform, Turkmenistan / Germany
  2. Bayram Shikhmuradov, edi­tor of Gundogar news por­tal, Turkmenistan/Dubai
  3. Farid Tukhbatullin, Turkmen Initiative for Human Rights, Turkmenistan/Austria
  1. Yashnar Khayitov, Head of Russian-Turkmen Oguz Community, Turkmenistan / Russia
  1. Ogulnur Charyyeva, Owadan Dere Youtube Channel, Turkmenistan/US
  1. Nadezhda Atayeva, “Human Rights in Central Asia” Association, Uzbekistan / France
  1. Bobodzhon Kayumzon, jour­nal­ist, Tajikistan / Lithuania
  1. Humairo Bahtiyor (Muminova), jour­nal­ist, Tajikistan / Germany
  1. Mahmudjon Faizrahmonov, activist, Tajikistan / Austria
  1. Ilhomjon Yokubov, activist, Tajikistan / Lithuania
  1. Muhiddin Kabiri, activist, Tajikistan
  1. Temur Varki (Klychev), jour­nal­ist, Tajikistan / France
  1. Dinara Oshurakhunova, Kyrgyzstan Civil Control Committee, Kyrgyzstan
  1. Leyla Nazgul Seiitbek, KyЛейла Назгуль Сеитбек, Kyrgyzstan Civil Control Committee, Kyrgyzstan