How Maksat Duisenov ‘set up’ all political refugees

It appears that German judi­cial author­i­ties are close to extra­dit­ing for­mer Transport Prosecutor of the Republic of Kazakhstan Maksat Duisenov to the General Prosecutor’s Office of Kazakhstan. After a month of pro­ceed­ings, not only did they find no evi­dence that Duisenov was being polit­i­cal­ly per­se­cut­ed in his home­land, but they also began to won­der whether the EU author­i­ties were being too trust­ing of those who claim to be polit­i­cal refugees.
Ulysmedia.kz reports on the details of this case.

From a German prison to one in Kazakhstan

Maksat Duisenov is a fig­ure wide­ly known in cer­tain cir­cles in Kazakhstan. His career is inex­tri­ca­bly linked to the ups and downs of Kairat Kozhamzharov. But while Duisenov fol­lowed his boss at Finpol and oth­er law enforce­ment agen­cies, the crim­i­nal case against him in Kazakhstan was opened a month ear­li­er than the one against Kozhamzharov. He was arrest­ed in absen­tia in Kazakhstan, but Maksat Duisenov end­ed up in prison in Germany, at the deci­sion of the German author­i­ties. As Deputy Prosecutor General of Kazakhstan, Galymzhan Koigeldiev explained, Kazakhstan ini­ti­at­ed the process of extra­dit­ing Duisenov. Still, the German author­i­ties need­ed time to under­stand the cir­cum­stances, as Duisenov him­self claimed polit­i­cal per­se­cu­tion in his home­land and request­ed asy­lum. At the same time, Duisenov him­self con­tin­ues to insist that his crim­i­nal pros­e­cu­tion has polit­i­cal motives and is relat­ed to his pre­vi­ous offi­cial activ­i­ties. Judging by all appear­ances, the cir­cum­stances have been established. 

Based on the mate­ri­als of the extra­di­tion and migra­tion case, a con­sol­i­dat­ed posi­tion of three key German author­i­ties can be iden­ti­fied — the Higher Regional Court of Nuremberg-Fürth, the Nuremberg Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF): no com­pelling grounds for refus­ing extra­di­tion have been iden­ti­fied, the for­mal con­di­tions have been met, and the prin­ci­ple of dou­ble crim­i­nal­i­ty has been con­firmed. The court also con­sid­ered the high risk of Maksat Duisenov abscond­ing and there­fore remand­ed him to cus­tody pend­ing a final decision.

In addi­tion, the BAMF, the only author­i­ty assess­ing the issue of polit­i­cal asy­lum, not only failed to make a final deci­sion, but also, most like­ly, did not believe the ‘refugees’ story. 

Firstly, the for­mer trans­port pros­e­cu­tor had nev­er been a dis­si­dent and had not been involved in polit­i­cal or social activ­i­ties. Secondly, before his arrest, he led a life that bore lit­tle resem­blance to that of a polit­i­cal refugee. Duisenov had not worked offi­cial­ly for many years and had no source of income, yet short­ly before apply­ing for asy­lum, he and his fam­i­ly made numer­ous expen­sive trips abroad: Thailand, Turkey, Brazil (Rio de Janeiro, Iguazu), Argentina (Buenos Aires, Perito Moreno), Peru, Brazil again, Russia, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Dubai, Qatar, and Germany.

“The BAMF treats such sto­ries as a clas­sic mark­er of unre­li­a­bil­i­ty (Unglaubwürdigkeit), because a per­son who is tru­ly flee­ing polit­i­cal per­se­cu­tion does not trav­el around the world on tourist routes. A per­son who fears arrest or per­se­cu­tion does not pass through dozens of pass­port con­trols — but he did. Travelling through 7–10 coun­tries is the behav­iour of some­one who feels safe, has cap­i­tal and free­dom of move­ment, not some­one who is being “per­se­cut­ed”,‘ com­ments Asel Temirova, anti-cor­rup­tion expert, mem­ber of Transparency International Germany and the TI DE project group ’Demokratie und Integrität” (Democracy and Integrity), on Maksat Duisenov’s rela­tion­ship with the German authorities.

How is Duisenov damaging the reputation of political refugees?

The expert stud­ied all the doc­u­ments in the case of the for­mer chief trans­port pros­e­cu­tor and con­clud­ed that the sit­u­a­tion with Maksat Duisenov’s asy­lum request demon­strates a typ­i­cal prob­lem: major cor­rupt offi­cials, tak­ing advan­tage of changes in the polit­i­cal cli­mate or loop­holes in inter­na­tion­al law, try to avoid respon­si­bil­i­ty by obtain­ing asy­lum abroad. According to Asel Temirova, cor­rupt offi­cials should not be allowed to become ‘refugees’ by using inter­na­tion­al pro­tec­tion to evade pun­ish­ment, espe­cial­ly if they them­selves were part of a cor­rupt sys­tem, abused their pow­er and are not polit­i­cal fig­ures. The crim­i­nal pros­e­cu­tion of Duisenov is not relat­ed to his reli­gious beliefs or polit­i­cal posi­tion. All charges are based on spe­cif­ic facts, and the pros­e­cu­tion is exclu­sive­ly crim­i­nal, not polit­i­cal. We are talk­ing about cor­rup­tion involv­ing tens of mil­lions of dol­lars. In recent years, a num­ber of for­mer Kazakh offi­cials, includ­ing high-rank­ing secu­ri­ty offi­cials, have fled abroad and start­ed sup­pos­ed­ly human rights or oppo­si­tion activ­i­ties, even though they had a ques­tion­able rep­u­ta­tion in Kazakhstan.

“If high-lev­el cor­rupt offi­cials are giv­en the oppor­tu­ni­ty to abuse the asy­lum sys­tem, this harms not only their coun­tries of ori­gin, but also European democ­ra­cies them­selves, turn­ing the refugee pro­tec­tion sys­tem into a tool for evad­ing respon­si­bil­i­ty. For Germany and the EU as a whole, as well as for Kazakhstan, this is a prece­dent that requires a del­i­cate approach: deny­ing asy­lum means trust­ing the Kazakh jus­tice sys­tem, while grant­i­ng asy­lum sends a sig­nal of impuni­ty to cor­rupt offi­cials,” says Asel Temirova.

Since Duisenov is not the first asy­lum seek­er with a dubi­ous rep­u­ta­tion, Asel Temirova and her col­leagues from Transparency International Germany intend to raise this issue for dis­cus­sion in the Bundestag, propos­ing to tight­en European asy­lum pol­i­cy to pre­vent fur­ther abuse of this institution.

Still – Khorgos

Furthermore, based on Temirova Asel’s analy­sis, it can be con­clud­ed that Kazakhstan’s main claims against Duisenov are still relat­ed to the Khorgos case — sys­temic cor­rup­tion with­in a group of indi­vid­u­als, effec­tive­ly organ­ised as a crim­i­nal group. 

• Episode 1 (September 2009 – April 2011): sys­tem­at­ic bribes for smug­gling through Khorgos. Every week, $250,000–300,000 in cash col­lect­ed from smug­glers was trans­ferred to Duisenov through an inter­me­di­ary, Makhatov. During this peri­od, the total amount exceed­ed $22 million. 
• Episode 2 (March 2011): extor­tion of $200,000 from busi­ness­man T.T.M.
• Episode 3 (spring 2011): Operation Karavanfurer — doc­u­ment­ed bribes and mur­der of a wit­ness. As part of the oper­a­tion, the KNB record­ed how Duisenov and Makhatov organ­ised extor­tion from cus­toms, receiv­ing $202,400. Makhatov was lat­er con­vict­ed of mur­der­ing a wit­ness in an attempt to cov­er up the scheme. 
• Episode 4 (April 2015): bribe with a BMW X6 car

Money laundering

In addi­tion to receiv­ing bribes, Duisenov is charged with legal­is­ing (laun­der­ing) mon­ey obtained by crim­i­nal means. Through his broth­er’s bank accounts, Duisenov cashed out more than 5.5 bil­lion tenge (equiv­a­lent to approx­i­mate­ly $12–13 mil­lion at the aver­age exchange rate for the peri­od). In addi­tion, Maksat Duisenov’s fam­i­ly pur­chased expen­sive prop­er­ties in Astana and Almaty, reg­is­tered in the names of his wife and broth­er. These includ­ed apart­ments, a man­sion in the Medeu dis­trict and land plots, some of which were lat­er re-reg­is­tered through rel­a­tives and front men. Since the German author­i­ties found no grounds for refus­ing to extra­dite Maksat Duisenov, except for the risk of tor­ture, the General Prosecutor’s Office of Kazakhstan has the oppor­tu­ni­ty to show polit­i­cal will and con­firm that the coun­try is ready to act accord­ing to the prin­ci­ples of legal­i­ty and trans­paren­cy. Duisenov real­ly has noth­ing to fear — not only are the judi­cial author­i­ties wait­ing for him, but also the peo­ple, who are demand­ing jus­tice and a purge of corruption.

Author: Samal Ibrayva
Original arti­cle in Russian: ULUS MEDIA

Translated from Russian with DeepL

Read also:

Fugitive Maksat Duissenov: What Is the Former Prosecutor and Member of Kozhamzharov’s Team Known For?

Expert Opinion

Independent Review of the Extradition Request from the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning Mr Maxat Duissenov 

I.Introduction

This expert opin­ion has been pre­pared based on the analy­sis of offi­cial doc­u­ments issued by the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the case mate­ri­als of the Nuremberg-Fürth Court, and the records of the extra­di­tion pro­ceed­ings in Germany.

The pur­pose of this doc­u­ment is to pro­vide an inde­pen­dent pro­fes­sion­al assess­ment of the pros­e­cu­tion of Mr Maxat Duissenov, the legal nature of the charges against him, poten­tial mis­use of the asy­lum mech­a­nism, and argu­ments rel­e­vant in light of European stan­dards on human rights and anti-cor­rup­tion practices.

II. Brief Case Summa­ry

Maxat Duissenov is a for­mer Colonel of the Financial Police of Kazakhstan and a for­mer pros­e­cu­tor, accused in his home coun­try of seri­ous cor­rup­tion-relat­ed offences. He was arrest­ed in absen­tia by a Kazakh court and placed on an inter­na­tion­al want­ed list in 2025.

On 22 September 2025, he was detained in Zirndorf, Germany, pur­suant to an Interpol notice. Shortly before his arrest, he had sub­mit­ted an appli­ca­tion for asy­lum. The Republic of Kazakhstan sub­se­quent­ly sub­mit­ted an offi­cial extra­di­tion request to Germany (let­ter from the General Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Kazakhstan dat­ed 15 September 2025), accom­pa­nied by a full set of case materials.

III. Short Summa­ry of Charges (Duissenov, Makhatov, Zhum­abekov)

Episode 1 (September 2009–April 2011): Systematic bribery relat­ed to smug­gling oper­a­tions through the Khorgos bor­der cross­ing. It was estab­lished that, week­ly, Duissenov received USD 250,000 – 300,000 in cash through an inter­me­di­ary, Makhatov, who col­lect­ed the mon­ey from smug­glers. Between September 2009 and April 2011, the total amount exceed­ed USD 22 million.

To con­ceal the cor­rupt scheme, the Financial Police, head­ed by Duissenov at that time, for­mal­ly reg­is­tered Makhatov as a confi­den­tial infor­mant under the alias “Beton”, there­by dis­guis­ing his actu­al role in the col­lec­tion of bribes.

Episode 2 (March 2011): Extortion of USD200,000 for the Removal of Illegally Imposed Obstacles to Carrier T.T. Mirvanov:

In 2011, sev­er­al freight car­ri­ers attempt­ed to avoid pay­ing the imposed cor­rupt “trib­ute.” Entrepreneur T.T. Mirvanov estab­lished an alter­na­tive route for import­ing goods from China via the Dostyk bor­der cross­ing, bypass­ing Khorgos. Upon learn­ing this, Zhumabekov, a sub­or­di­nate of Duissenov, report­ed to his supe­ri­or that Mirvanov’s con­voy of sev­en trucks was en route to Almaty for cus­toms clear­ance at the Alter ware­house. Duissenov respond­ed with coer­cive pres­sure, as before: On 29 March 2011, Zhumabekov sent an offi­cial let­ter to the Almaty Customs Office con­tain­ing false infor­ma­tion about alleged “smug­gling” and demand­ing that T.T. Mirvanov’s trucks be detained. All sev­en vehi­cles were ille­gal­ly stopped and blocked. Zhumabekov per­son­al­ly arrived at the ware­house and pro­hib­it­ed the release of the goods with­out his autho­ri­sa­tion. Finding him­self in a crit­i­cal sit­u­a­tion, T.T. Mirvanov con­tact­ed the already known inter­me­di­ary Talgat Makhatov through busi­ness acquain­tances to “set­tle the issue.”

The fol­low­ing day, at the restau­rant “Tyubeteika,” the price was announced: USD 200,000 for the release of the trucks and the com­ple­tion of cus­toms clear­ance. Having no oth­er option, T.T. Mirvanov agreed; the mon­ey was hand­ed over to Makhatov through trust­ed inter­me­di­aries. Immediately after the bribe was received, all detained vehi­cles were released.

Episode 3 (Spring 2011): Opera­tion“Caravan Leader”–Documented Bribery and the Murder of a Witness

Around the same peri­od, Duissenov and Makhatov decid­ed to insti­tu­tion­alise the col­lec­tion of illic­it pay­ments from cus­toms offi­cials. Their tar­get was K.U. Prinbekov, head of the Almaty-West TOO cus­toms post. At Duissenov’s instruc­tion, Makhatov offered K.U. Prinbekov to make month­ly pay­ments in exchange for “pro­tec­tion,” oth­er­wise threat­en­ing to cre­ate prob­lems – up to ini­ti­at­ing crim­i­nal pro­ceed­ings against the post’s staff. However, K.U. Prinbekov report­ed the case to the National Security Committee (NSC/KNB). The KNB opened a covert oper­a­tion under the code­name “Caravan Leader”, with­in which Prinbekov was engaged as a confi­den­tial infor­mant (“Oreke”) and under­cov­er agents were deployed into Duissenov and Makhatov’s circle.

During con­trolled meet­ings, Makhatov specified the “tar­iff”: USD 300 per stan­dard truck and USD 1 500 per truck car­ry­ing large ship­ments – the mon­ey was intend­ed for Duissenov. In total, Makhatov and Duissenov received USD 202 400, con­sti­tut­ing a par­tic­u­lar­ly large-scale act of bribery.

These covert oper­a­tions were cap­tured on video and audio, serv­ing as irrefutable evi­dence. Subsequently, the crim­i­nal group resort­ed to extreme mea­sures to cov­er their tracks: In 2024, Talgat Makhatov was con­vict­ed of mur­der­ing M.K. Zhamashev, the inter­me­di­ary involved in trans­fer­ring the bribe, in order to elim­i­nate a key wit­ness to the cor­rup­tion scheme.

Episode 4 (April 2015): Bribe in the Form of a BMW X6

Several years after leav­ing the Financial Police, Duissenov con­tin­ued to benefit from his influen­tial con­nec­tions. In 2015, while serv­ing as an advi­sor at the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Civil Service Affairs and Anti-Corruption, he effec­tive­ly received an expen­sive gift from his for­mer sub­or­di­nate, Makhatov. Duissenov instruct­ed Makhatov to pur­chase a lux­u­ry car – a BMW X6 – for his mis­tress D.K. Akhmetova. On 18 April 2015, Makhatov bought a BMW X6 xDrive35i (2013 mod­el, brown) worth approx­i­mate­ly USD 90,000. On 22 April 2015, the vehi­cle was reg­is­tered in Akhmetova’s name. This lav­ish gift is regard­ed as a bribe in the form of prop­er­ty of significant

val­ue and falls under Article 366, Part 3, Point 3 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

IV. Money Laundering (2016–2023)

In addi­tion to tak­ing bribes, Duissenov is charged with laun­der­ing funds obtained through crim­i­nal means. The inves­ti­ga­tion revealed that mul­ti-bil­lion-tenge sums were fun­nelled through the accounts of his rel­a­tives and ulti­mate­ly accu­mu­lat­ed in fam­i­ly assets that could not be justified by their offi­cial income.

A.FictitiousTransactions to his Brother’s Accounts.

The fol­low­ing amounts were trans­ferred to the bank accounts of Duissenov’s broth­er, A.K. Duissenov:

• 474,442,166 tenge (19 July 2016)

• 1,230,392,000 tenge (29 July 2016)

• 120,005,000 tenge (29 July 2016)

• 853,000,000 tenge (18 August 2016)

• 1,920,843,000 tenge (29 September 2016)

• 46,363,776 tenge (21 November 2023)

• 13,892,700 tenge (27 November 2023)

All of these funds were sub­se­quent­ly with­drawn in cash. The total amount exceed­ed 5.5 bil­lion tenge, equiv­a­lent to approx­i­mate­ly USD 12–13 mil­lion at the aver­age exchange rate dur­ing the rel­e­vant period.

B. Luxury Real Estate Registered to Relatives

Despite the absence of any offi­cial income, Duissenov’s fam­i­ly acquired a num­ber of high-val­ue real estate prop­er­ties in Kazakhstan.

On 20 April 2018, through his broth­er A.K. Duissenov, an apart­ment in Astana (14V Alikhan Bokeikhan Street, apt. 9) was pur­chased for 149 mil­lion tenge, along with two park­ing spaces (each worth 6.54 mil­lion tenge). In 2020, this prop­er­ty was re-reg­is­tered in the name of G.B. Zharkynbayeva, the wife of M.K. Duissenov.

Previously, on 18 July 2014, G.B. Zharkynbayeva had pur­chased an apart­ment in Astana (45/1 Abay Avenue, apt. 69) for 64.5 mil­lion tenge and a park­ing space for 3 mil­lion tenge.

In 2019, G.B. Zharkynbayeva, the wife of M.K. Duissenov, also received, as a gift, an apart­ment in Almaty (97 Dostyk Avenue, apt. 15, with garage), which had pre­vi­ous­ly been reg­is­tered under the name of third stakeholders.

In Almaty, A.K. Duissenov became the own­er of a land plot and man­sion locat­ed in the elite Medeu dis­trict, val­ued at approx­i­mate­ly 392 mil­lion tenge. The house was built between 2012 and 2016. Additionally, a large apart­ment (173.9 m²) in a res­i­den­tial com­plex on Khozhanov Street 81, with an esti­mat­ed val­ue of 183.6 mil­lion tenge, was reg­is­tered in his name as a gift in 2019.

Further inves­ti­ga­tions revealed prop­er­ty and share trans­fers to oth­er rel­a­tives – includ­ing his sis­ter Sh.K. Duissenova, Z.A. Kerimbayeva/Keribay, T.A. Kerimbayeva, and oth­ers – with­out com­pen­sa­tion. This indi­cates the cre­ation of a chain of nom­i­nee own­ers aimed at con­ceal­ing the true ownership of assets.

V. Position of the German Authori­ties(Court, Prosecutor’s Office, BAMF)

Based on the mate­ri­als of the extra­di­tion and migra­tion pro­ceed­ings, a con­sol­i­dat­ed posi­tion of three key German insti­tu­tions can be iden­tified: the Higher Regional Court of Nuremberg-Fürth, the Nuremberg Prosecutor’s Office, and the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF).

• No manda­to­ry grounds for refusal of extra­di­tion were identified.

• The for­mal require­ments for extra­di­tion have been met.

• The prin­ci­ple of dou­ble crim­i­nal­i­ty applies.

• A high risk of flight was recog­nised; there­fore, release was ruled out.

• The issue of a pos­si­ble polit­i­cal nature of the pros­e­cu­tion remains under assess­ment. (since Duissenov claimed that he is being persecut­ed for polit­i­cal reasons)

VI.On Political Persecution, Risk of Torture, Fair Trial Guarantees, and the Asylum

The case of Maksat Duissenov illus­trates a broad­er pat­tern: many high-lev­el cor­rup­tion figures, tak­ing advan­tage of polit­i­cal changes or gaps in inter­na­tion­al law, attempt to evade account­abil­i­ty by seek­ing asy­lum abroad. In recent years, sev­er­al for­mer Kazakh offi­cials, includ­ing senior law enforce­ment officers, have fled the coun­try under threat of crim­i­nal prosecution.

The case of Maksat Duissenov illus­trates a typ­i­cal prob­lem: many high-rank­ing cor­rup­tion figures, invok­ing polit­i­cal change or gaps in inter­na­tion­al law, attempt to evade crim­i­nal lia­bil­i­ty by seek­ing asy­lum abroad. In recent years, for­mer Kazakh offi­cials, includ­ing senior law enforce­ment officers, have fled abroad to avoid pros­e­cu­tion, such as Kairat Kozhamzharov, Baurzhan Baibek, Mukhtar Ablyazov, Viktor Khrapunov, and oth­ers. European states, as well as Russia and Belarus, have at times grant­ed pro­tec­tion even to indi­vid­u­als with ques­tion­able reputations.

After a com­pre­hen­sive review of all avail­able doc­u­ments and meet­ings with whistle­blow­ers, it can be stat­ed with confi­dence that this case is not polit­i­cal in nature. The pros­e­cu­tion is not linked to Duissenov’s beliefs or polit­i­cal activ­i­ty. The charges are based on specific fac­tu­al evi­dence, and the pro­ceed­ings are pure­ly crim­i­nal, not polit­i­cal. This case con­cerns sys­temic cor­rup­tion involv­ing tens of mil­lions of U.S. dol­lars, con­duct­ed over sev­er­al years, with the par­tic­i­pa­tion of fam­i­ly mem­bers, inter­me­di­aries, and ficti­tious trans­ac­tions used for mon­ey laundering.

The argu­ment that Duissenov might be at risk of tor­ture rep­re­sents a typ­i­cal defence tac­tic of cor­rup­tion sus­pects, but there is no evi­dence what­so­ev­er to sup­port such a claim in this case. Duissenov has nev­er been an oppo­si­tion figure or dis­si­dent; he is pros­e­cut­ed not for his polit­i­cal opin­ions, but for large-scale cor­rup­tion. There are no legit­i­mate con­cerns regard­ing the trans­paren­cy of judi­cial pro­ceed­ings in Kazakhstan. Such cas­es can be held pub­licly and open to media and civ­il over­sight, as demon­strat­ed, for instance, in the Saltanat Nukenova mur­der case. The court hear­ing against Duissenov could be con­duct­ed pub­licly, with inter­na­tion­al mon­i­tor­ing, reg­u­lar report­ing, and inde­pen­dent com­plaint mech­a­nisms available.

As an anti-cor­rup­tion expert and mem­ber of Transparency International Germany, I firm­ly believe that a corruption suspect cannot quali­fy as a refugee and should not be allowed to exploit international protec­tion as a means to escape justice– espe­cial­ly when he him­self was part of the pow­er struc­ture and abused his posi­tion. Corruption under­mines state insti­tu­tions as severe­ly as polit­i­cal repres­sion or tyranny.

In Duissenov’s case, the issue is not mere per­son­al enrich­ment, but sys­temic abuse of pow­er that has caused direct and indi­rect harm to mil­lions of cit­i­zens of Kazakhstan – through the loss of pub­lic rev­enue, ero­sion of insti­tu­tion­al trust, and dis­tor­tion of justice.

Allowing cor­rup­tion figures to mis­use the asy­lum mech­a­nism harms not only their coun­tries of ori­gin but also European democ­ra­cies them­selves, as it turns the asy­lum sys­tem into a tool of impunity.

For Germany, the European Union, and Kazakhstan, this case rep­re­sents a prece­dent requir­ing a care­ful and bal­anced approach: Refusing asy­lum means plac­ing trust in Kazakhstan’s jus­tice sys­tem, where­as grant­i­ng asy­lum would send a mes­sage of impuni­ty to cor­rupt officials.

VII. The economic aspect must also be taken into account.

According to esti­mates cit­ed in sev­er­al ana­lyt­i­cal reports and pub­li­ca­tions from var­i­ous German fed­er­al states, the cost of hold­ing one per­son in pre-tri­al deten­tion (U‑Haft) in Germany is approx­i­mate­ly €150 – €200 per day. Duissenov has been in pre-tri­al deten­tion since September 2025 and is expect­ed to remain in cus­tody until the end of December 2025. These expens­es are ful­ly borne by the pub­lic bud­get of the State of Bavaria, rep­re­sent­ing an addi­tion­al finan­cial bur­den on German tax­pay­ers, par­tic­u­lar­ly in the case of an indi­vid­ual accused of large-scale cor­rup­tion. This fur­ther rein­forces the need for a prompt and well-rea­soned deci­sion on extradition.

Conclusion

Based on the analy­sis of offi­cial case mate­ri­als, court doc­u­ments, and rel­e­vant EU human rights stan­dards, the fol­low­ing con­clu­sions can be drawn:

1. The pros­e­cu­tion of Maksat Duissenov is pure­ly crim­i­nal in nature.

2. The case mate­ri­als pro­vide detailed confir­ma­tion of the cor­rup­tion charges.

3. No evi­dence of polit­i­cal moti­va­tion has been established.

4. There is no sub­stan­ti­at­ed indi­vid­ual risk of torture.

5. The asy­lum appli­ca­tion is like­ly being used as a means to evade crim­i­nal liability.

***

Based on the analy­sis of the Duissenov case pre­sent­ed above, it appears nec­es­sary to place sev­er­al sys­temic issues on the anti-cor­rup­tion pol­i­cy agen­da and to raise them for polit­i­cal con­sid­er­a­tion, both with­in Transparency International Germany and in the Committee on Internal Affairs as well as the Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid of the German Bundestag.

A. What mech­a­nisms can be imple­ment­ed to pro­tect the asy­lum sys­tem from abuse by indi­vid­u­als involved in cor­rup­tion and eco­nom­ic crimes?

B. How can the bal­ance between pro­tect­ing human rights and avoid­ing impuni­ty for per­sons who have com­mit­ted cor­rup­tion offences be ensured?

C. Is there a need to strength­en the train­ing and qual­ifi­ca­tions of BAMF staff to dis­tin­guish more pre­cise­ly between gen­uine polit­i­cal per­se­cu­tion and attempts to con­ceal cor­rup­tion offences?

D. Would it be appro­pri­ate to estab­lish an inde­pen­dent expert group (includ­ing rep­re­sen­ta­tives of Transparency International) to analyse cas­es of pos­si­ble mis­use of the asy­lum system?

E. Should Germany revise the cri­te­ria for grant­i­ng asy­lum to indi­vid­u­als accused of seri­ous cor­rup­tion offences—without a polit­i­cal con­text of persecution—who nonethe­less claim polit­i­cal motivation?

Expert Opinion: Independent Review of the Extradition Request Concerning Mr Maxat Duissenov from the Federal Republic of Germany

Prepared by Assel Temirova

Anti-Corruption Expert, Member of Transparency International Germany and the TI DE Project Group “Democracy and Integrity”.

(This opin­ion rep­re­sents the author’s inde­pen­dent pro­fes­sion­al assess­ment and does not reflect the offi­cial posi­tion of Transparency International.)